by Foggy Bottom

The international community has recently been racked by a string of nuclear crises: Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iraq again, Libya, and Iran. So far, the US has characterized the problem of nuclear proliferation through the lens of “rogue states.” Rogue states are reckless and tyrannical regimes shun the rules of the international community to amass power and weaponry. The case of Iran is just another chapter in this tragic story. However, the recent crises in nuclear diplomacy may only be a prelude a greater disaster. We will soon witness the collision of two of the great dilemmas of our time: nuclear proliferation and energy security.

The nuclear proliferation quandary is relatively straightforward. Nuclear weapons are considered dangerous and immoral. The international community agrees that nuclear weapons must be abolished, or at a minimum controlled, at all costs. Nuclear weapons states, paradoxically, also agree that nuclear weapons must be controlled, since nuclear proliferation would reduce their relative clout. However, the same technologies that are used to produce the core elements of a nuclear weapon are also used for peaceful nuclear energy. Therefore the international community has needed to find a way to allow for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while avoiding the diversion of nuclear technology for the development of nuclear weapons. Up until now, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has served the role of the world’s nuclear watchdog, by monitoring international nuclear facilities to ensure that civilian nuclear means are not diverted to military ends. This system seemed to work relatively well until the 1990s. Following the 1991 Gulf War, it was discovered that Saddam Hussein’s regime had developed a sophisticated nuclear weapons program under the disguise of a legitimate civilian nuclear program. This discovery triggered a crisis of confidence in the IAEA and the set of international laws, treaties, and safeguards that form the so-called nonproliferation regime. The international community reacted by strengthening the monitoring of nuclear facilities. The recent events in Iran, however, sparked a second crisis of confidence in the nonproliferation regime. A seemingly bellicose Iran was seen as developing all the infrastructure needed to develop nuclear weapons, legally, right under the nose of the international community. All that Iran would need to do is too pull out of the Nonproliferation Treaty, within months of developing a nuclear weapons capacity. In response to this second crisis, several states, including the IAEA have suggested curtailing the right to nuclear power. Noting that the capability to produce nuclear fuel could be used to produce nuclear weapons, some have suggested centralizing the production of nuclear fuel in a few trustworthy countries.

Such ways to address nuclear proliferation fly in the face of another great dilemma: energy security. Energy security refers to the secure access to energy supply. Energy security has become a growing concern for the international community, particularly with regards to carbon-based fuels such as oil and gas. Ever since the 1973 oil shocks, oil has been increasingly seen as a strategic vulnerability. The problem with oil can be boiled down to two concerns: security and supply. Western states are increasingly uncomfortable depending on unstable and ideologically hostile Middle East for such a critical resource. Dependence on oil has forced many a democracy to cozy up to unpalatable regimes, and get involved in nasty and distant conflicts. Terrorist organizations, well aware of the West’s dependence on oil have begun targeting oil facilities. However, like two old ladies complaining at their Catskills resort: “The food is so bad…. and the portions are so small;” if dependence on oil is not bad enough, it is also a limited resource. Global energy consumption is expected to double by 2035 and triple by 2055, particularly as the mammoth economies of China and India get on-line. Furthermore, while there is enough oil to last the world for several more decades, the real oil crisis won’t occur when companies extract the last drop from the ground. The crisis in oil will occur when increases in oil production will not be able to keep up with increases in demand (see Chart). There is a lot of controversy and propaganda regarding when exactly peak oil production will occur, but suffices to say that it will happen before the end of the century. At that point, the price of oil will steadily increase, competition for what oil is left will intensify, and wise countries will start looking elsewhere to satisfy their energy needs. Otherwise, concerns over global warming and the associated obligations under the Kyoto Protocol will push certain countries to develop non-carbon based energy sources.

At this point, countries will have a number of options including gas power, coal, hydrogen, renewables such as hydroelectric, wind, solar, and biomass and nuclear power. Gas power suffers many of the same faults as oil. It is a non-renewable resource, which although cleaner than oil, is not evenly spread out in the world. As the recent experiences of Russia turning off the tap of natural gas to Ukraine and Western Europe in the midst of a cold snap vividly illustrated, natural gas is not always in reliable supply. Coal power, even so-called clean coal which reduces acid rain, still produces greenhouse gases and can be fairly expensive. Hydrogen power, oft stated by President Bush in his speeches, is a clean burning fuel, but needs to be produced. This production takes energy. If the energy needed to produce hydrogen comes from non-renewables, then we are back at square one. Wind and solar power are relatively expensive and/or unreliable on a massive scale, and biomass requires an amount of land that simply is not sustainable for most states.

Faced with these difficult choices, many countries are taking another look at nuclear power. Despite the living memory of the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, nuclear energy is making a big comeback. Argentina, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, India, Finland, France, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and the US have all begun to plan, at times massive, construction of nuclear power plants. China, for example, will have 26 nuclear power plants by 2025. Indeed many states are starting to see the environmental risks associated with nuclear energy as manageable in comparison with the environmental and political costs associated with oil. For example, the world’s two largest uranium producers are Canada and Australia, which seem appealingly benign in comparison to Saudi Arabia and Russia, the world’s two largest producers of oil. Nuclear power does not emit carbon dioxide. Nuclear plants can be built in large numbers close to the populations they serve. Nuclear reactors could be used to produce hydrogen, which could then be distributed in clean fuel-efficient vehicles and utilities. Certain types of nuclear reactors, known as “fast breeders” even produce plutonium fuel as a byproduct to be used in another reactor.

As a growing number of nations come to see nuclear power as a sustainable power source, they will seek to develop so-called fuel cycles of their own. States will become weary of relying on other states for their nuclear fuel, since they understand this would only recreate the strategic liabilities posed by carbon-based energy sources. Therefore, there will be a greater number of states that will develop the necessary infrastructure to manufacture nuclear fuel. Of course, this same technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons, should the state’s security situation demand it. Indeed, in a world where a new nuclear power plant will be built every month, we can expect several more crises regarding the peaceful intentions of states. Today it is only Iran and North Korea, yet tomorrow it could be Syria, Brazil, Nigeria, Poland, or Indonesia. The IAEA, swamped with a ballooning number of facilities to inspect, may become a less reliable tool to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The diplomatic crisis in Iran is therefore only the tip of the iceberg of the coming disaster. How the international community handles this tough case has implications that will reach much further than the Middle East.

Foggy appeared out of nowhere and started submitting some hard hitting policy pieces. We know his name, Foggy Bottom, seems to refer to a neighborhood in Washington and that he seems to have a perspective shaped by governmentality. He’s taught us some things about assumptions and interpretation already, so he’s living up to the great tradition of Anonymous journalists of the 19thC so far and I’d like to keep him around. So welcome Foggy B.! and thanks to One Neck for doing this Deep Throaty depiction of him.

check out the Core Contributors page. from there you can get to all posts by or about Mr. Foggy B.

While unrest was simmering across Europe and the Muslim world in the wake of the recent row surrounding the Mohammed cartoons, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called to the newly minted Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay to congratulate him on his appointment. Amidst the light and amicable banter that accompanies such courtesy calls, Minister MacKay told his American counterpart that the two countries has fared relatively well amidst the cartoon row because of their deeply engrained cultures of tolerance and multiculturalism. One could argue that North America was spared from the violence by showing enough common sense to not publish needlessly provocative content, rather than by any sense of multiculturalism. However, there is some truth to the idea that tolerance and multiculturalism are assets to the West. Indeed, the capability of Western societies to adapt and absorb large numbers of foreigners will become the key to their survival in the 21st century.

Adaptability has always been a determinant of the security and prosperity of societies. This adaptability has been present in technology. Societies that could innovate, or emulate the technological development of their peers, have tended to fare better, whereas those who failed to do so have tended to be exploited, defeated, or eliminated altogether. Adaptability has also been present in economics. Those societies, which developed the most efficient means of production, and adapt to the pressures of regional and international competition have prospered. Adaptability has been present in politics. Modern liberal democracies have currently proven to be optimal structures by allowing for the accountability and transparency needed for smooth running capitalist economies and technological progress. Adaptability is “built-in” to the liberal democratic order since it allows for change of government and free and open debate. These liberal democratic societies have allowed for precisely the transparency and communication needed to spur the radical technological advances of modern information societies. Now, demographic adaptation will become another prime determinant of the prosperity and security of Western societies.

First some basics in Western demography. Rich countries are getting old and this is has become a major preoccupation for their governments. At the same time as life expectancy have increased, fertility rates have dropped. This is largely a side-effect of modernity. People stay in school longer, marry later, seek to maintain higher levels of disposable income. Women are a greater part of the workforce, and couples tend to divorce more often. If present trends in fertility continue, Europe will reach a peak in population by 2022. Afterwards, it will be up to an ever smaller working population to support their elderly counterparts. According the Jeremy Rifkin, elderly entitlements in Germany already account for 15% of the state’s GDP. By 2040, it is expected to reach 26%. This will create a net drag on the economy that will make it less competitive on the international scene. Governments have tried to address these trends in several ways. The Bush administration has tried to reform social security to reduce the burden of an elderly population that may reach 26% of the US by 2050. Other governments have tried to reverse this trend by providing incentives for childbirth. Indeed, a recent report from the European Union noted that Western Europe benefits from the flow of labor from Eastern Europe. However, unless certain Western societies double their birthrate, they will need a major influx of immigrants to stay competitive. It is not immigration that threatens Western societies and their economies, but rather lack of immigration. This dire predicament is not universal. North America for example has fared much better demographically. While a slightly higher fertility rate can account for some of the difference, it is also North America’s openness to immigration that is significant.

Western societies that bar immigrants will become atrophied and impoverished. The well-being of younger generations will crushed by the weight of entitlements for the elderly as their undermanned economies slow down. However, raw immigration is not enough to solve the demographic dilemma. Immigration must be accompanied by respect, integration, openness, and economic fairness. Societies that develop a reputation for the fair and respectful integration of immigrants will encourage the best and the brightest to immigrate. This reputation will also provide the host state with moral and diplomatic clout and international goodwill. At the same time, multiculturalism via diasporas will help build political and trade bridges with emerging markets and help dampen eventual cultural clashes.

However, Western societies that accept immigrants but do not respect cultural diversity or provide them with meaningful opportunities will eventually be faced with civil unrest. This civil unrest will serve to exacerbate racial and religious tensions. Greater fertility rates in the immigrant populations will stoke fears of loss of national identity and corresponding xenophobia. This vicious cycle of intolerance and unrest has been characteristic of Western Europe from the French riots to the assassination to Dutch cineaste Theo van Gogh. Such violence and domestic xenophobia will also tarnish the reputations of these societies abroad.

What does these emerging demographic realities tell us? For starters, it shows that bigotry, racism, and xenophobia while reprehensible in their own right, are becoming liabilities to the prosperity and security of Western societies. There is a certain pragmatism behind multiculturalism. Far from being the result of some liberal relativism, multiculturalism is an underpinning of the new demographic realism. Where nationalism used to be a power multiplier for the revolutionary armies of Napoleon, it is now becoming a straightjacket of the national interest. In this sense political and economic liberalism have finally merged. Civic and political rights are not only inalienable, but essential to the prosperity of liberal economic societies. These realities also tell us that truly multicultural societies (often nations formed from immigration) such as Canada, the US, Australia, and are well suited to prosper in the 21st Century. Those societies that are too rigid to adapt to immigration will fail. Multiculturalism is therefore survival.

On Saturday February 4th, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors referred Iran to the UN Security Council. For the US, this was a significant and long awaited diplomatic victory. Since 2003, it had been actively lobbying the member-states of the IAEA Board of Governors to sanction Iran for technical violations of its treaty obligations and what it saw as a clear Iranian drive for nuclear weapons. Although there was mounting evidence of Iran’s violations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US had found it difficult to rally international support for sanctions. First, the EU was committed to using diplomacy, persuasion and incentives to convince Iran it was in its best interests to abandon its nuclear program. Until recently, it therefore saw the referral of Iran to the Security Council as counterproductive. Second, Russia was reluctant to refer Iran to the Security Council because it had significant investments in Iran’s civil nuclear energy program. These investments involved an $800 million deal to build the Bushehr reactor and potentially millions more in the provision and reprocessing of nuclear fuel for these Russian-built reactors. China for its part was keen on maintaining relations with Iran on even keel in order to ensure a steady supply of oil for its booming economy. China’s willingness to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for the sake of largely American non-proliferation interest should be seen a major concession and bodes well for future Sino-American relations. While the issue of Iran’s referral caught the newspaper headlines, it just may be China’s willingness to compromise that is indicative of the most important changes to come.

One of the most significant geopolitical trends in the last decade has been China’s dramatic economic growth and concomitant demand for energy. In the beginning of the 1990s, for the first time in recent history, China became a net importer of oil.

This shift in the structure of the Chinese economy had some radical implications for the conduct of China’s foreign policy.

China has traditionally been a conservative and regional great power, keeping largely to its own. Domestic political and economic problems have tended to demand much of its attention. China has, intentionally or not, relatively little capability to project power abroad. China has few expeditionary forces, a small navy with no aircraft carriers, and a very limited nuclear deterrent. Some pundits claim that if China were to attempt to invade Taiwan, it would end up being a “million man swim.” This inward focus is also represented in its foreign policy. China is champion of state sovereignty. It abhors foreign interventions in what it sees as domestic affairs. China has been involved in few wars since World War II, despite its overwhelming size. It has not sought alliances, supported many foreign insurgents and revolutions, or engaged the world.

China’s emerging dependence on foreign oil has changed the geopolitical underpinnings of its foreign policy. China can no longer strive to achieve any form of autarchy or independence from the world. In order to maintain it prodigious growth, China will actively need to ensure continued access to oil abroad. Consequently, in the span of a decade, China has begun engaging oil producing nations outside of East Asia. Chinese officials began talking not only with the traditional suppliers in Gulf region, but also with oil rich and politically unsavory countries as Sudan, Iran, and Libya. This energy dependence could lead to major diplomatic frictions with the US. The US sees such Chinese entreaties as actively challenging its efforts to contain and undermine “rogue states.” The US will lose its leverage with such states if China can offer them all the technologies and markets they need. Furthermore, rogue states could use the capital provided by China to fund military and other weapons production activities. This demonstrates the crux of the problem: China’s future prosperity depends on ready supply of energy whereas America’s security depends on containing certain oil rich states: China’s prosperity versus America’s security. Such a dynamic will only worsen distrust between the world superpower and its next most likely challenger and exacerbate other irritants including the status of Taiwan, North Korea, and Chinese human rights.

It is within this framework that one needs to evaluate China’s decision to support the IAEA’s decision to sent Iran to the UN Security Council. In this case, China has decided to forgo its energy interests in Iran in order to help the US address its security concerns. This cooperative goodwill bodes well for the future of Sino-American relations. Indeed, China’s prosperity is increasingly becoming dependent on American security. A catastrophic attack on the US would have a major ripple effect on the world economy including China. Lastly, China has invested $242 in the US government’s debt and has an interest in assuring that the American economy, and consequently American security, stays on even keel.

Canadians live in a vast and inhospitable land. In discussing France’s wars with England over Quebec in the 18th Century, Voltaire once lamented on waste of blood and treasure committed for “quelques arpents de neige.” It is time for Canada to break from the tyranny of cold. It is time that Canada annexes the Turks and Caicos.

The Turks and Caicos (T&C) are an overseas territory of the United Kingdom situated some 300 kilometers north of Haiti and 250 kilometers east of Cuba. The territory is made up of some 40 islands, eight of which are inhabited. The total population of the Turks and Caicos is a small 20,550.

The idea of Canadian annexation of the islands has a long historical pedigree. Canadian Prime Minister Borden pioneered the idea of annexing T&C in 1917. The issue reemerged in 1974 when a MP Max Saltsman introduced a private members bill to study a relationship between T&C and Canada. In 1986, members of the T&C government approached the Canadian government with the view of establishing a special relationship. Polls commissioned in T&C at the time suggested that some 90% of the population favored such an association. The Canadian parliamentary Sub-Committee on External Affairs chaired by David Daubney, released a report soon thereafter concluding that it would be inappropriate for Canada to unilaterally institute formal talks with the T&C given that an election was imminent in the Islands, and Canada could not be seen to be interfering in the internal, free democratic process in another country. The idea of some form of annexation of the island was most recently resurrected in 2003 by MP Peter Goldring, and by the Parliament of Nova Scotia, which extended an invitation for T&C to join Canada.

There are significant costs and benefits at play in the potential Canadian annexation of the T&C. First the annexation of a new territory by Canada would carry significant political consequences. Canada derives considerable legitimacy from the fact that it is not considered a colonial power. The international community tends to see Canada as an honest broker, a friendly third power with friends in high places. Canadian diplomats benefit from a large degree of trust. Such trust, credibility, and political capital could be eroded should Canada annex an overseas territory, albeit with the consent of most Turks and Caicosians. Second, the annexation of T&C would extend Canadian territories in proximity of a politically turbulent region of the world. T&C’s closest neighbors are Cuba and Haiti. Cuba is the last remaining bastion of communism on the continent. While not an expansionist or threatening state by any real measure, its geriatric leadership and economic underdevelopment are fertile ground for political upheaval. Haiti for its part is the poorest state in the Western hemisphere. It has been racked by instability and civil war, and ravaged by disease. The proximity of T&C would act as a magnet for desperate Haitian and Cuban refugees seeking to escape political persecution, dire poverty, and social unrest. Canada could begin to see the influx of refugees similar to which has affected the Southeastern United States. This could test Canadian immigrations laws and put the lives of thousands of refugees at risk on the high seas. Equally important, the defense of the territory would disproportionately strain the already stretched capacity of Canadian Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard. Second, the annexation of the T&C could have significant economic consequences. While T&C benefits from a warm climate, it doesn’t have the lush tropical climate of its Caribbean neighbors. Most of is island is also arid and its soil is unsuitable to most agriculture. As a result, T&C is a relatively poor, with a per capita GDP of $ . The T&C would become a net drain on the Canadian economy – a warm Newfoundland if you will – siphoning funds from richer Canadian provinces for transfer payments and social services such as schools and hospitals. Indeed, there would be little reason to voluntarily cede one’s sovereignty if not to join a prosperous welfare state. Third, there are serious constitutional questions involved in annexation of any territory. Would the T&C join as a territory or as a province of the Canadian Federation?

If the annexation of the T&C has been a perennial Canadian dream it is because it promises a number of important benefits. First and foremost, it would offer Canada a place in the sun. Safe and warm beaches, an English speaking population, and Canadian dollar-based currency would surely attract a larger number of Canadian tourists. Encouraging Canada’s tourism and retirement community to spend its hard earned dollars on Canadian soil (or sand) would ensure keep tourist dollars in Canada. Tourism income would help rectify the economic imbalances between mainland Canada and the T&C. Tourism would also help the federal government to reap tax benefits, cushioning the initial social economic costs of annexation. Over time, the T&C could develop into a platform for Canadian goods on the Caribbean marketplace. From a military point of view, the T&C could provide a strategic foothold for the Canadian military in the Caribbean region, reducing pressure on Canada’s underdeveloped airlift capabilities. This would enable Canada to establish a base for greater power projection. Canada could use this power projection to interdict drug trafficking and piracy, and provide support for its peacekeeping operations nearby Haiti.

On Wednesday January 25th, against the prediction of the foreign policy analysts, the Islamist party won the Palestinian parliamentary elections, claiming 76 of the 132 parliamentary seats and securing a majority in parliament. While many Palestinians genuinely support the goals of Hamas, many others were simply voting in anger against the Fatah party, widely seen as corrupt and incompetent.

The reaction from the West to the election of Hamas was swift and scathing. The European Union and the US stated that they consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization and refused to deal with it. In addition, they stated that they could not continue providing aid to the Palestinian Authority until Hamas renounced violence and recognized the existence of Israel. With no hint of irony, President George W. Bush said: “A political party, in order to be viable, is one that professes peace, in my judgement, in order that it will keep the peace.” The EU and US reactions were significant since they are the largest foreign aid partners of the Palestinian Authority, funneling some $608 and $400 million a year respectively (the GDP of Palestine is itself only some $2,568 million). Without this aid, the whole apparatus of government could fall apart in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas retaliated that it will not submit itself to such western “blackmail.”

To many, the results of the election seemed like a further step into spiraling cycle of violence in the Middle East. However, such feelings are misguided. The surprise election of Hamas is the best thing to happen to the region.

Regardless of how one feels about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or about the inherent right of people to democratically elected leaders; it is not hard to see Hamas as a destabilizing actor in the region. The 1988 Charter of the party states in plain letters: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.” Furthermore, eschewing any peaceful settlement, Hamas preaches violence. “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.” Hamas has also been known to recruit child soldiers to carry out suicide attacks. In one episode, they strapped a semi-retarded 16-year-old boy with explosives. Political scientists have traditionally labeled Hamas a “spoiler” in peace negotiations since they undermine peace agreement between Palestine and Israel to pursue the radical, and many believe unrealistic, goal of destroying Israel. Indeed, these facts make many people doubt the wisdom of President Bush’s drive for democracy in the Middle East announced last year. President Bush always assumed that like East Asia after World War II and East Europe after the Cold War, democracy in the Middle East would bring in regimes sympathetic to Washington, not ones dedicated to destroying its close allies.

However, it is important to remember the kinder, gentler side of Hamas. Part of the reason why Hamas is so popular is that it is a provider of social services. In fact, Hamas devotes much of its estimated $70 million annual budget to funds schools, orphanages, mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues. In a country where the government cannot provide even the most basic services to its citizens, this does grant Hamas a large degree of legitimacy.

If Hamas is intent in staying in power, the elections will bring this radical outsider into the fold, while sapping its ability to use violence. Indeed, democratic election is a double-edged sword. While many people focus on the sheer power that elections bring to parties, they often forget that with great power comes great accountability. When Hamas was an outsider in the Palestinian political process, it was to a large extent free to do whatever it wanted. It could attack Israel, criticize the Fatah government, make boisterous statements and promises, and buy the loyalty of Palestinians through selective distribution of social services. What’s more, as a non-governmental entity, Hamas could melt into civil society as necessary to evade retribution by Israeli or Palestinian Authority security forces. All this has changed with the election of Hamas into power. Now, Hamas will need to deliver for the Palestinian people. Far from leveraging the state apparatus to wage Jihad on Israel, Hamas will get sucked into the tedious minutiae of government. It will need to focus on bread and butter issues such as fixing potholes on city streets, water quality, garbage disposal, civil service management, and tax collection. Hamas will need to moderate its message in order to continue receiving the foreign aid Palestine so desperately needs to rebuild. If and when it ever gets around to continuing to attack Israel, Hamas will realize that the rules of the game will have changed. Palestinians will ask why Hamas is playing around with bombs instead of taking care of their immediate needs. Certain studies have also found that Hamas social services only really benefit a minority of Palestinians. When in power, such blatant favoritism will tend to draw more ire than awe. If and when violence erupts within Palestine or between Palestine and Israel, people will come to Hamas for answers. Hamas will also no longer be able to undertake asymmetrical warfare with as much tactical skill and agility. They cannot launch rockets and suicide bombing attacks on Israel expecting to blend back among innocent civilians. As a result of its ascent to power, Hamas is now a highly public entity. It will have public headquarters, branch offices, and such. Israel will have a number to call (or bomb) if Hamas claims an attack on its neighbor. If recent claims that Hamas intends to merge its military forces with those of the Palestinian forces are true, then many of Hamas’ militants will no longer be anonymous terrorists, but instead uniformed soldiers. As such they will become clear and legitimate targets under the Hague Conventions on the laws of war.

It is hard to believe that Hamas, with all of its political experience, would have unwittingly fallen into this “peace trap.” There is good reason to believe that Hamas has made the strategic decision to pursue more peaceful political means to achieve moderate objectives. In the past Hamas boycotted Palestinian elections and pursued violence with the intent of destroying Israel. As such, Hamas was pursuing an old and time-tested bargaining strategy: exaggerate your position and back it up with credibility. Now, Hamas is capitalizing on this credibility in order to gain political power. A strong victory in the elections also provided Hamas with the ideal face-saving mechanism to peacefully come into the fold of normal politics. The case of Northern Ireland is instructive in this regard. The Sinn Fein party, which was considered the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) make considerable political gains after the IRA declared a cease-fire in 1994.

Yet not all is won. There remain several risks at hand. First, democracy does not necessarily mean peace. According to Fareed Zakaria, democracy only tends to bring peace, stability, and prosperity when accompanied by freedom. The election of leaders, without a robust culture of civil and human rights, can be the recipe for a tyranny of the majority and/or bellicose demagoguery. Columbia professor Jack Snyder echoes this point by arguing that without a coherent state grounded in a consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad. Second, with Hamas in power, there are no guarantees that another party will not fill the void of violent resistance. So long as Palestinians are desperate, poor, and feeling oppressed by Israel, there will be a demand for violent revolution. It is possible that the Al Aqsa Brigades, a paramilitary group of Fatah, may take over the violent role played by Hamas. Lastly, while the election of Hamas may bode well for peace in the Middle East, in the near term it will derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Although tacit bargaining will continue, Israel and Hamas will not accept to recognize each other.

However, what is odd is that the Liberal Party would make any mention of this issue at all. First, there currently are no weapons in space. Second, if Canada were to take initiatives in diplomacy, it would seem more appropriate to focus on more immediate and deadly international issues, such as (to pick a few) civil war in Sudan, unrest in Haiti, human rights in China, or child soldiers in Uganda. Third, Canadian elections have traditionally been remarkably introverted, focusing on domestic issues such as education, unemployment, or health care. And last, achieving a ban on all weapons in space seems at odds with the overriding goal, established by the Liberal in their recent International Policy Statement, of seeking enhanced bilateral relations with the US. Paul Martin’s Liberal Party would most likely be able to organize a large coalition of states to sign a space weapons ban. Indeed, the resolution on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) passes with overwhelming majorities in the UN General Assembly. Prime Minister Martin and Canada would most likely be nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for these efforts.

The only problem in this plan is that the only country voting against the PAROS resolution is the US. Therefore seeking a ban on space weapons and seeking better relations with the US becomes a zero-sum game: what helps one cause damages the other. The US has made it increasingly clear that it should have all means at its disposal to protect its space assets. This policy shift was spearheaded in 2001 by Donald Rumsfeld, before he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense. Indeed, the US will soon have more invested in outer space than it presently does in Europe and is keen to find a way to adequately protect these assets. It sees the current efforts to ban space weapons a delusional at best and dangerous at worst. The US Secretary of Defense and US Space Command (motto: Masters of Space) are seeking ways to promote what are called “Counterspace operations” . Therefore, how exactly the Liberals wish to fulfill their promise remains very much to be seen.

So have the Canadian Liberals become dewy-eyed idealists? Hardly. While an eventual weaponisation of space would be remarkably expensive, destabilizing, militarily ineffective, and environmentally devastating, it does not in and of itself warrant such a high priority in any election campaign. But from their experience debating the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD), the Liberals know that space weapons are a hot button issue, stirring strong emotions (although perhaps not necessarily understanding) among voters.

While BMD and space weapons are distinct questions, they are related, and are seen as interchangeable by many Canadians. The Liberals also know that space weapons are a wedge issue for the Conservative Party. Many moderate Conservatives and defecting Liberal voters are tired of the Liberal Party, but are also apprehensive about certain segments of the Conservative platform, namely their stated intention to re-start discussions with the US on Canadian participation in BMD. Lastly, the Liberals know that BMD was very unpopular in Quebec, somewhat as unpopular as the Liberals currently appear to be in that province. Promising a ban on space weapons is a cheap way to try to garner support. Because diplomacy always depends on factors external to any nation’s control, the Liberals will never be held accountable if their initiative never materializes.

While the pursuit of a ban on all weapons in space is a noble cause, Canadians should not be fooled by such promises during this election Campaign. (Canadians should also not be fooled by any Conservative BMD promises, but that is a post for another day.)

F.B.

[Update: Foggy B. sent me an updated draft of "Trouble in Tehran" with lots new links and even a few pictures.]

In an act that stunned diplomats, a few days ago Iran announced that it would not attend negotiations with the so-called EU-3 (France, Germany, and the UK). The next week, Iran announced that it would resume research work on uranium conversion. Britain, France, Germany, and the US harshly condemned the move and vowed to have Iran sanctioned in the UN Security Council. Iran then retaliated that if it were referred to the Security Council it would cease to cooperate with international inspections of its facilities. What is going on here?

Diplomacy can at times be a subtle and occult art—and nuclear diplomacy is more so, with more potentially dramatic consequences. Nuclear diplomacy with the political maze that is Persian politics is nearly impossible. Despite the attention catching headlines in the media, the West’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran has been going on for quite some time now. It began in 2002, when a Marxist rebel group called the National Council for Resistance in Iran (NCRI) revealed the existence of previously undisclosed heavy water plants and gas centrifuge experiments that could be used for plutonium production and uranium enrichment respectively. This was the first significant and confirmed evidence of a secret nuclear program. Since then, the International Atomic Energy Agency has uncovered a number of facts that provide strong circumstantial evidence that Iran may be seeking to use its nuclear program for non-civilian purposes. While the US continued its hard-line stance towards Iran following these revelations, European powers (EU-3) attempted to mollify the Iranian regime through a package of economic and technological incentives. In essence the US and Europe were playing good cop/bad cop with Iran. Negotiations have been dragging on ever since.

Up to date, negotiations with Iran have failed. The main issue of contention remains civilian nuclear research. Europe will not accept that Iran be allowed to develop indigenous civilian nuclear capabilities and Iran has refused any deal that does not allow it to develop such capabilities. The EU refuses to allow Iran to develop these capabilities because it knows that they could provide a cover to develop virtually all the technology necessary for the development of nuclear weapons. Iran, for its part refuses to give up such research programs for several reasons. First, it argues that it is its inalienable right to access nuclear technology under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Second, Iran sees the development of nuclear technology as a symbol of its modernity (the medieval stoning of criminals, repression of women, and suppression of democracy notwithstanding). Successive political regimes have convinced common Iranians that nuclear technology is the sine qua non of progress. True to the teachings of Nobel game theorist Thomas Schelling, they understand that the best bargaining strategy can at times be to burn your own bridges in such a way that it would be impossible to compromise or retreat on certain positions.

Technically, Iran is entitled under international law to develop nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes. This right is enshrined under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It also does not help that most of the states chastising Iran for its nuclear research are themselves nuclear weapons states that are dragging their feet on implementing Article VI of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), which calls for the eventual disarmament by all countries.

That being said, the universal right to nuclear technology in the NPT is a hotly debated topic. The recent cases of Iraq and North Korea have shown that states can and will use their civil nuclear programs as smokescreens for developing nuclear weapons. Under the NPT these states can legally develop all the prerequisite technologies for nuclear weapons and then give the international community notice that it wishes to withdraw from the NPT. States have the right to do so, so long as they give the international community “6 months notice.” Seriously. Think of it as treaty satisfaction guaranteed, or your money back. Only in this case, you get to keep all the nuclear infrastructure. For this reason, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—the UN watchdog mandated to both promote nuclear technology and prevent its diversion to military purposes—and the Bush Administration have been keen on restricting the right to develop nuclear technology.

So, with all the recent hoopla, is Iran destined to become the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state? Not necessarily. Iran has basically three choices.

First, It can bow to international pressure and dismantle its indigenous nuclear program. This would cause some backlash from the hardliners, certain nationalist groups, and the military. On the other hand, it could avoid international sanction, receive aid from the EU, and become slightly less alienated from the US. This is not a small consideration when the Great Satan is cramping its style to the East in Afghanistan, and to the West in Iraq. Foreign aid would be welcome in a country with a demographic youth bulge and a sluggish economy (unemployed male youth are one of the strongest predictors of social unrest and war).

Second, Iran could pull out of the NPT and pursue a crash nuclear program. This would inevitably cause it to be referred to the UN Security Council, face economic sanctions, damage its relations with Russia, the West, and its neighbors. It would push Saudi Arabia and Egypt to pursue programs of their own to fend off Persian hegemony in the Middle East. On the flip side, Iran already seems destined for referral to the UN Security Council and tops the West’s shit list. The Iranian regime would receive a massive, albeit temporary, boost in domestic popularity. It could also meddle in the domestic affairs of Iraq and the Gulf States with greater impunity, knowing full well that any retaliation on a nuclear Iran would necessarily be muted. The case of India showed that conducting a nuclear test doesn’t always permanently destroy bilateral relations (so long as one has demographic, military, and/or economic clout).

A third, but rarely mentioned, option would be for Iran to develop nuclear technology up to the so-called nuclear “threshold” within the NPT and no further. That is, it would develop all the technology and material it needs to build a nuclear weapon in a short time frame, but remain in the NPT and avoid any talk of developing nuclear weapons, or any preparations of nuclear explosions. This is what policy wonks call a “virtual arsenal.” A virtual arsenal would allow Iran to avoid the most severe international sanctions but retain a virtual bomb in the basement in case things get ugly. But, you may ask, what is the point of having a nuclear weapon if no one knows that you have one? Well this is where a handy little concept called “existential deterrence” comes into play. The potentially vast destructive power of nuclear weapons means that even a relatively small doubt in the mind of your adversary would be sufficient to deter them from doing something they would otherwise do. The evidence marshaled by Israel, the US, and Europe in favor of referring Iran to the UN will also plant the seeds of doubt that Iran may very well have nuclear weapons of their own. Meanwhile, by developing its civil space launch program, Iran will also develop the technologies needed to lob its future nuclear weapons to intercontinental range. Indeed, the IRSL space launch vehicle and the Shahab 5-class ballistic missile are virtually identical devices.

What can be done? In Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, Tel Aviv, and Washington, this is the question of the hour. Generally speaking, options are becoming more limited.

First, the current course. Europe has tried to extend some economic carrots to Tehran, but they failed to resolve the question of civilian nuclear programs. Even if Washington came on board and proposed to normalize diplomatic relations with Iran, it is unlikely that Iran would compromise its nuclear program based on such sweet promises. The prospect of improved bilateral relations does not hold much currency for a regime whose legitimacy is derived in large part from confrontation with the US.

Second, as a result of a lack of imagination and/or bureaucratic lethargy, the world could do nothing. Indeed, the natural state of most governments is rest… incompetent rest. Iran could become a nuclear weapons state. As noted above, this would have a deleterious effect on regional dynamics. Poor command and control structures in shoddy and run down Iranian forces coupled with non-existent early warning networks could mean an accidental launch of Iranian nuclear weapons or their theft by non-state actors. A Persian bomb would also deliver a devastating blow to the fabric of international law by undermining the credibility of the NPT.

Third, a concerned state or coalitions of states could pursue military action to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear program. The major advantages of this line of action are that it does not require the consent of Iran, and it would potentially deter future nuclear proliferators. UK, the US, and Israeli officials have all hinted that such an option was “on the table.” UK, the US, and Israeli officials have all hinted that such an option was “on the table”

There are several options that may be pursued within this strategy. There can be a full-scale invasion accompanied by regime change à la Iraq to help permanently solve the problem. Such a course of action would not only be terribly costly but also unfeasible.

Iran is larger, more militarily powerful, and more nationalistic than Iraq. Its terrain is more amenable to resistance and insurgency. The dominant militaries of the US and Europe, and Russia, are already strained in current military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya respectively.

If a full-scale military operation is unworkable, then a set of limited precision strikes on key nuclear facilities would be an alternative. Israel conducted such strikes on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981, and set back Iraq nuclear weapons program by a few years (interesting trivia: one of the Israeli pilots involved in the Osiraq strikes later became an astronaut and was killed in the 2003 Columbia Shuttle accident. You can imagine the comments regarding divine retribution that then came out of Iraq) Currently, Iran has deployed a set of anti-aircraft batteries around the Bushehr reactor as well as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. While these defenses will have little effect on a well-planned attack, they do highlight the political importance associated with these facilities. A targeted strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would likely lead to reprisals in other theatres of operation through a number of proxies. Iran could worsen the already dismal state of affairs in Iraq through its influence on the large Shia population. It could beef up support for Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. It could provide arms and other logistical support to insurgents in Afghanistan. At the moment, Iran avoids these needless provocations in order to keep a low profile, but the potential does exist.

A last option available to is a covert attack on Iranian facilities, one that would not be traced back to any one state, and provide a measure of plausible deniability to the state(s) involved. A little known fact is that Israel also used this method of operation in the past using the cover of an anti-nuclear environmental group to sabotage parts of the Osiraq reactor while it was in storage in France en route for Iraq. The environmental group was never heard of before and never heard of again. More recently, a group of Israeli national security experts submitted a report to PM Sharon entitled “Project David” recommending a similar course of action in Iran. Interested states could use either agents or proxies to carry out the operations. Relatively little would be needed to destroy infiltrated facilities such as a centrifuge plants since they have a large number of sensitive parts moving at the speed of sound. It would not be hard to find any number of organizations that hold a grudge with the current Iranian regime.

A few years ago, I attended a public meeting of the National Council for Resistance in Iran (NCRI) in a café in Vienna’s Ringstrasse regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The group that presented there did not seem capable of carrying out the intelligence operations it was taking credit for. Since then, it has been discussed that they received their information from Israeli and/or American intelligence sources. Such a group would be an obvious candidate for undertaking such a sabotage operation if and when circumstances would demand.

Whatever happens over the next couple of months, it should be interesting. Stay tuned.
F.B.