Open Journal Montreal

Foggy Bottom breaks it down.

On Wednesday January 25th, against the prediction of the foreign policy analysts, the Islamist party won the Palestinian parliamentary elections, claiming 76 of the 132 parliamentary seats and securing a majority in parliament. While many Palestinians genuinely support the goals of Hamas, many others were simply voting in anger against the Fatah party, widely seen as corrupt and incompetent.

The reaction from the West to the election of Hamas was swift and scathing. The European Union and the US stated that they consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization and refused to deal with it. In addition, they stated that they could not continue providing aid to the Palestinian Authority until Hamas renounced violence and recognized the existence of Israel. With no hint of irony, President George W. Bush said: “A political party, in order to be viable, is one that professes peace, in my judgement, in order that it will keep the peace.” The EU and US reactions were significant since they are the largest foreign aid partners of the Palestinian Authority, funneling some $608 and $400 million a year respectively (the GDP of Palestine is itself only some $2,568 million). Without this aid, the whole apparatus of government could fall apart in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas retaliated that it will not submit itself to such western “blackmail.”

To many, the results of the election seemed like a further step into spiraling cycle of violence in the Middle East. However, such feelings are misguided. The surprise election of Hamas is the best thing to happen to the region.

Regardless of how one feels about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or about the inherent right of people to democratically elected leaders; it is not hard to see Hamas as a destabilizing actor in the region. The 1988 Charter of the party states in plain letters: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.” Furthermore, eschewing any peaceful settlement, Hamas preaches violence. “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.” Hamas has also been known to recruit child soldiers to carry out suicide attacks. In one episode, they strapped a semi-retarded 16-year-old boy with explosives. Political scientists have traditionally labeled Hamas a “spoiler” in peace negotiations since they undermine peace agreement between Palestine and Israel to pursue the radical, and many believe unrealistic, goal of destroying Israel. Indeed, these facts make many people doubt the wisdom of President Bush’s drive for democracy in the Middle East announced last year. President Bush always assumed that like East Asia after World War II and East Europe after the Cold War, democracy in the Middle East would bring in regimes sympathetic to Washington, not ones dedicated to destroying its close allies.

However, it is important to remember the kinder, gentler side of Hamas. Part of the reason why Hamas is so popular is that it is a provider of social services. In fact, Hamas devotes much of its estimated $70 million annual budget to funds schools, orphanages, mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues. In a country where the government cannot provide even the most basic services to its citizens, this does grant Hamas a large degree of legitimacy.

If Hamas is intent in staying in power, the elections will bring this radical outsider into the fold, while sapping its ability to use violence. Indeed, democratic election is a double-edged sword. While many people focus on the sheer power that elections bring to parties, they often forget that with great power comes great accountability. When Hamas was an outsider in the Palestinian political process, it was to a large extent free to do whatever it wanted. It could attack Israel, criticize the Fatah government, make boisterous statements and promises, and buy the loyalty of Palestinians through selective distribution of social services. What’s more, as a non-governmental entity, Hamas could melt into civil society as necessary to evade retribution by Israeli or Palestinian Authority security forces. All this has changed with the election of Hamas into power. Now, Hamas will need to deliver for the Palestinian people. Far from leveraging the state apparatus to wage Jihad on Israel, Hamas will get sucked into the tedious minutiae of government. It will need to focus on bread and butter issues such as fixing potholes on city streets, water quality, garbage disposal, civil service management, and tax collection. Hamas will need to moderate its message in order to continue receiving the foreign aid Palestine so desperately needs to rebuild. If and when it ever gets around to continuing to attack Israel, Hamas will realize that the rules of the game will have changed. Palestinians will ask why Hamas is playing around with bombs instead of taking care of their immediate needs. Certain studies have also found that Hamas social services only really benefit a minority of Palestinians. When in power, such blatant favoritism will tend to draw more ire than awe. If and when violence erupts within Palestine or between Palestine and Israel, people will come to Hamas for answers. Hamas will also no longer be able to undertake asymmetrical warfare with as much tactical skill and agility. They cannot launch rockets and suicide bombing attacks on Israel expecting to blend back among innocent civilians. As a result of its ascent to power, Hamas is now a highly public entity. It will have public headquarters, branch offices, and such. Israel will have a number to call (or bomb) if Hamas claims an attack on its neighbor. If recent claims that Hamas intends to merge its military forces with those of the Palestinian forces are true, then many of Hamas’ militants will no longer be anonymous terrorists, but instead uniformed soldiers. As such they will become clear and legitimate targets under the Hague Conventions on the laws of war.

It is hard to believe that Hamas, with all of its political experience, would have unwittingly fallen into this “peace trap.” There is good reason to believe that Hamas has made the strategic decision to pursue more peaceful political means to achieve moderate objectives. In the past Hamas boycotted Palestinian elections and pursued violence with the intent of destroying Israel. As such, Hamas was pursuing an old and time-tested bargaining strategy: exaggerate your position and back it up with credibility. Now, Hamas is capitalizing on this credibility in order to gain political power. A strong victory in the elections also provided Hamas with the ideal face-saving mechanism to peacefully come into the fold of normal politics. The case of Northern Ireland is instructive in this regard. The Sinn Fein party, which was considered the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) make considerable political gains after the IRA declared a cease-fire in 1994.

Yet not all is won. There remain several risks at hand. First, democracy does not necessarily mean peace. According to Fareed Zakaria, democracy only tends to bring peace, stability, and prosperity when accompanied by freedom. The election of leaders, without a robust culture of civil and human rights, can be the recipe for a tyranny of the majority and/or bellicose demagoguery. Columbia professor Jack Snyder echoes this point by arguing that without a coherent state grounded in a consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad. Second, with Hamas in power, there are no guarantees that another party will not fill the void of violent resistance. So long as Palestinians are desperate, poor, and feeling oppressed by Israel, there will be a demand for violent revolution. It is possible that the Al Aqsa Brigades, a paramilitary group of Fatah, may take over the violent role played by Hamas. Lastly, while the election of Hamas may bode well for peace in the Middle East, in the near term it will derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Although tacit bargaining will continue, Israel and Hamas will not accept to recognize each other.

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[ originally posted on Tuesday, January 31st, 2006 at 9:15 am and is filed under Communication, Everything, Foggy, On Places and Identities. ]