Open Journal Montreal

4 Responses to “No Blood for Mangoes: Haiti and regime change in America.”

1. Dave Says:
   May 12th, 2004 at 11:07 am

   footnote # 1

   "No Blood for Mangoes: Haitian and American Democracy or An attack on neo-liberalism."
   author: David
   genre: A letter in reponse to Simon

   Simon, I must admit your rant on the situation in Haiti has made me worry. For fear that LSE is pumping to much neoliberal bullshit into you, I feel I must challenge a number of the statements that you wrote weeks ago concerning Haiti, although in choosing exactly how to respond, I’ve reached a weak conclusion at the end of my political reasoning. But first, lets start with the premise that
   neither the re-emergence of the army (400 “rebels”) as a political actor nor the replacement of Aristide’s death squads by arguably more violent ones sponsored by Latortue et al. constitute as you say an action that is in line with the interests of Haiti’s people.

   Now, I’ve taken your words slightly out of context; as you said it was in their interest given the potential of a bloodbath (despite the fact that US, French, and Canadian forces are mostly in Cap-Hatien allowing near free-reign for reprisal killers in the capital.) Of the oppressiveness of Aristide regime, I will offer no praise, although I would consider his most grievous crime being his return in 1994 as a puppet of a US-backed IMF reform program that has devastated Haiti’s majority of destitute poor. Clearly his decision to run illegally for a third term as president contributed to the devolution of Haiti’s first fledgling democracy into another dictatorship (although three of his first five year term was spent in exile in the US), but the fact that he was elected overwhelmingly would suggest the despise that the population has for the elite class of Haitians that just picked up exploiting where the French
   left off in 1798.
   It seems to me that US innocence in the origination of the coup is far from inconclusive. While it’s likely true that the US has little use for Haiti (economic, military, or otherwise), two major points are worth considering in why the US would intervene despite initial contrary statements. Firstly, as you noted Simon, a “failed state” in the Carribbean left to its own vices would no doubt draw fierce criticism towards the United States and increase the ability for other Latin states to follow the lead of those governments that have come to power partly by capitalizing on the sentiment of anti-Americanism and disillusionment of American-style capitalism. Simply put, no one wants a backyard that’s totally out of control, but if we can keep part of it looking nice by dumping rusty old trucks in the woods, who cares (that’s a bad Tennessee analogy, sorry).
   Secondly, the DR figures importantly into the equation because it is a supposed example of success in the Carribbean. A civil war in Haiti would send refugees (at the very least and not just into the DR but towards Florida, important election state) and threaten to destabilize a very fragile Dominican economy. So in my view, the United States has acted very much in consideration of its own interests and throughout the debacle practiced very little “diplomacy”- unless of course, we’re referring to the Bush administration’s definition: I don’t believe the dictionary definition of diplomacy is what the Bush administration believes it to be: “threaten the other nation with financial, political, and military blackmail until they meet every one of our vague demands and then its their problem if they get bombed.”
   Anyway, Monsieur Jean-Phillippe and crew somehow managed to receive US weapons and substantial training while next door in the DR, and I’m sure this didn’t pass unnoticed by either that government or the Americans. The weeks of negotiation before the coup were entirely erratic, with the Bush administration offering Aristide terms which he accepted only to have Phillippe reject them. Rather than find further compromise, the American ambassador then returned to offer Aristide the rebel’s terms. It was basically the same situation that existed before international “mediators” came in. The US, Canada, and France each had interests to pursue and what resulted was the least violent alternative that also coincided with most of these nations’aims. (France mostly because of its francophoneness and Canada for both that consideration and also because it was Paul Martin’s first chance to kiss American ass in foreign policy). The Bush administration’s clumsy handling of the situation in Haiti, the forcing of a head of state to sign a resignation letter, and allowing a small group of insurgents to use force and scare tactic to suppress opposition to the coup are nothing that deserve praise, or even “credit where credit is due.”
   Now let’s attack the intellectually regressive school of neoliberalism. As Scoob noted from Chile, it takes absolutely no stretch of the imagination to support the status quo, and each of those economists should be shamed for doing so. The Economist dresses up petro-imperialism in pretty language in an attempt to rationalize systematic oppression; its still more refreshing than all US publications, but only marginally.
   Each of us has studied various aspects of a world of haves and have-nots albeit with various degrees of disgust. Insofar as the “science” of economics purports to study the allocation of scarce resources, it never ceases to anger/upset/frustrate me that mainstream theory has centered itself on a system that fulfills that goal so inefficiently (in terms of resources) and so unequally. As a result of global capitalism based on the nation-state, third world nations have been relegated to a position where attracting investment has become the only source of economic growth. Simon, I find it interesting that in stating Haiti’s need to provide security and property rights, the principal reason you provide for doing so was to attract foreign investors. In a country where the richest
   1% owns some 50% of the national economic resources, foreign investment would likely fall into the elites already well-lined pockets and national income expended on Mercedes, Land Rovers, and other expensive cars would increase from the 25% of national product it is now to about 30%. The miracle of trickle down economics has only scant evidence in the developed world; in the developing world, it is a resounding failure; more often, an increase in foreign investment overwhelmingly increases dependence on foreign imports. Even if there is a multiplier effect through an investment-led economy, dependence on foreign investment for long-term national economic growth has proven itself as a shaky means of building economic policy. As we’ve seen in Mexico and throughout Central America and the Caribbean, the old strategy of the late 80s and early 90s no longer worked as cheap Asian labor markets opened up and even manufacturing found the move irrestible. In a world of some 212(?) distinct units, competing against each other to see who can produce goods thecheapest (and thereby live the shittiest possible life) it’s a negative sum game- the only winners are the rich countries (and most especially the rich in the rich countries) and the rich elite within each poor country that sells off national sovereignty for nearly nothing.
   Worst of all, the only real vehicle for growth in such a system is foreign investment. Although the stated end goal of academic neo-liberal economics is to spur growth to create sufficient demand to initiate a self-sustaining national market, let’s consider how that would operate in reality. As soon as a collection of American or Latin American states were to create demanding markets, North American and European companies would be immediately try to capture that market, undercut it, and then control it entirely. For the past four decades, Europe and North America have worked together to use bilateral trade agreements to dismantle trade arrangements in West Africa, the Caribbean, and South America. As I hinted at earlier, this has become a world of sellers and buyers. Unfortunately, the buyers are only able to provide the raw materials (which have long term decreasing terms of trade) for the products they (really the elite of the countries that buy techs and luxury good) eventually buy back at higher rate. In my opinion, the bounds of current world system are, and will increasingly become more insufficient for ending global poverty, preserving resources, and promoting an end to armed conflict.
   Now, the problem I arrive at is determining what the alternative is. While I’m certain that the bounds of the current system are insufficient and even murderous, I’m not sure what alternative is possible. My new line of thinking is to consider the world as a one unit that is undemocratic; I think it shortsighted to view the world as a collection of democratic and undemocratic states that are largely of their own doing, especially given the coincidence of development with race and religion, as well as the connectedness of the political leaders in the democratic and undemocratic states.
   So unlike you Simon, I have no thoughts on how to proceed from there. Without foreign involvement in Haiti, it’s possible that an all-out civil war that killed hundreds of thousands may have erupted. Each day international organizations and foreign militaries intervene all over the world and prevent the unnecessary loss of life, which is an admirable humanitarian aim, and clearly nation states (which are a theoretical manifestation of people) can be motivated by non-selfish forces. Sadly it seems to me this support only comes about in crisis rather than in creating a world humanity can share equally in. I had planned on tying this into the debacle in Mesopotamia, but the energy is lacking, but again, lets consider what this approach really means. In both countries, the most violent voices will get representation, and to a greater or lesser extent, they are the products of the perpetual systematic violence. But alas, this the point where my fury loses its steam, and I conclude that these problems require further discussion over good food with good friends and several bottles of wine sometime in the future. I like to imagine that relationships with the people in our lives are the most important and sustaining need. It saddens me think that there are people suffering in this world because money motivates others. But for now, summer is in the air and that means many wonderful things, despite the tragedies elsewhere.

   Much love, luck, and many dreams.
   Davey

2. Simon Says:
   May 12th, 2004 at 11:08 am

   footnote #2

   05/11/2004: "No Blood for Mangoes: pragmatic strategies versus systemic critique"
   author: Simon
   genre: A letter, a rebuttal, an ongoing discussion.

   Dudes,

   One should always be grateful for criticism because it affords you the opportunity to evaluate and sharpen your arguments and beliefs. Of course this does not mean that you should accept all criticism lobbed at you, and that is why I wanted argue why Dave is misguided with regards to the situation in Haiti. Although Dave definitely summoned valid points and drew attention to issues that I did not address, many aspects of his arguments are dubious and I think underline a dangerous outlook shared by all dudes, myself included. Fundamentally Dave and I are taking different tacks on the same issue. I am looking for pragmatic strategies to cope with a crisis situation where the loss of life is imminent. Dave is building a systemic critique of the factors that led to the situation in the first place and that are likely to contribute to poverty and instability in the future.

   First Dave mischaracterizes the frame of debate. I am not saying that American policy over the last year (or the last century for that matter) has been wise and I am not saying that the world economy and structural adjustment programs are the optimal solution to hoist the country out of poverty. I am simply denouncing the policy recommendations put forth by John Kerry because they are detrimental to Haitian and American interests and worse than those proposed by Bush. John Kerry thought that the U.S. should have intervened to keep Aristide in power. Bush decided that the U.S. should intervene in Port-au-Prince to ease the removal of Aristide and reconstruct a new government. Neither of the two advocated a restructuring of the terms of world trade, minimum wages for Haitian workers, or any of
   the things that could perhaps alleviate the chronic instability of the country in the long term. There were two sub-optimal and insufficient proposals and the one advocated by Bush was the least bad one. Dave’s complaints about the larger economic exploitation are irrelevant since they were not even on the table.

   Second, Dave argues that Bush only acted in Haiti to prevent an exodus of refugees into Florida, a swing state in next falls election. Although he is right to highlight that electoral politics associated with the decision, he omits the fact that a mass exodus puts Haitian refugees, floating on makeshift rafts, at risk. After the 1991 coup, roughly 41,000 tried to escape Haiti by boat. Surely many humanitarian decisions have mixed motives, but how relevant is that? Should we demand that the U.S. have absolutely pure humanitarian interests in order to act? If anything mixed motives are necessary to anchor humanitarian policy in the turbulent sea of election year public opinion. Clearly no one here is likening Bush to Mother Teresa, but denouncing mixed motives is not a good critique of policy. Dave commits a similar error in saying that Canada only sent troops to kiss American ass. Canada welcomes the world’s second largest Haitian diapora. In fact, the third largest Haitian city outside of the Haiti is Montreal with a population of 70,000. In the run up to the removal of Aristide, there were several protests in Montreal asking Paul Martin to intervene. National minorities have influence in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and it is no surprise that Canada, with its long history of humanitarian aid to Haiti and its expertise in peacekeeping, would once again play a stabilizing role. Besides, the U.S. cares little for the 500 soldiers Canada sent to Haiti. Everyone knows that if you want to look for cases of Canadian kissing American ass, look at issues of real concern the Bush administration like border security and missile defense not sideshows in Haiti.

   Third, I am quite astonished to find Dave being so supportive of keeping Aristide in power. Many dudes see George Bush as illegitimate since he came to power through fraudulent elections in 2000 yet believe that we should support Aristide who also came to power through fraudulent elections in 2000. Why the disparity? Are Haitians not deserving of an accountable and democratically elected government? And suppose we did opt to support Aristide in power (the same way we supported Diem before the Vietnam war). It is interesting that someone who criticizes George Bush for intervening unilaterally in Iraq to oust a dictator would now be advocating intervening unilaterally in Haiti to support an effective dictator. We would then be supporting an illegitimate ruler who runs the country with death squads, against the will of the majority of Haitian. We could then perhaps try to remedy Aristide’s heavy-handed ways through economic carrots and sticks. This would lead us to punish an island nation that is already the poorest in the Western hemisphere because of a leader that we are keeping in power. It simply does not make any sense morally or politically. Dave is correct to point out the appalling human rights record of the rebel groups (many of which were trained by the Canadian RCMP to work as policemen under Aristide) and the scourge of reprisal killings in provincial cities. But at least now, with Aristide and his Chimeres out of power and the international community on the ground, we can play a direct role in preventing human rights abuses and ensuring security in the countryside. Indeed, one of the first things done by the international community was to disarm the rebel groups and to dispel the illusion that they were going to be the heirs to power in Port-au-Prince. The sovereignty of states is not an inherent moral or judicial right. We need to reconceptualize our moral universe outside the social constructs of states. States are nothing but administrative
   zones with borders drawn in the sand in more or less arbitrary ways. Why do we consider the inviolability of states more important than the lives of the human beings that inhabit them? For every right to sovereignty is a responsibility to protect. While the legitimacy of intervention should always be emphasized and motives critically evaluated, the idea that we should never intervene in any country is fundamentally flawed.

   Fourth, Dave makes the contentious point that the U.S. and 400 rebels constructed the coup. This is false. Dissatisfaction with Aristide was widespread in Haiti and went far beyond the 400-odd soldiers that decided to exploit this dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was not necessarily due to the government’s neo-liberal policies but to chronic poverty and brutal repression that exist regardless of structural adjustment programs. While it is an understatement that the U.S. could made more of an effort on the diplomatic front, it is important to remember that the peace plan proposed by the U.S. was not one of “threaten the other nation with financial, political, and military blackmail until they meet every one of our vague demands and then its their problem if they get bombed,” but one backed by the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the UN. Furthermore conspiracy theories of Americans propping up puppet statesmen are hard to maintain since the process to select a new
   prime minister and establish elections were proposed by CARICOM (who originally opposed Aristide’s removal from power) and backed by Canada, the OAS, and the UN. Lastly, the UN Security Council legitimized the multinational peacekeeping role.

   Fifth, although I respect Dave’s knowledge of economics, he overlooks some basic facts. Aristide’s fraudulent elections in 2000 caused the suspension of foreign aid from the EU and the US. Haiti was losing $500 million because of Aristide’s rule. Dave rightly criticizes me for saying that security is necessary to secure property rights and attract foreign investment. What I should have said is that security is necessary to secure property rights to attract foreign and local investment, to ensure that children can attend school, and to help the economy run smoothly and transparently as possible. Furthermore I refuse to accept that Haiti should avoid foreign investment. How else are you expecting pump investment capital into a country with a GDP per capita of $1400 and a debt of 1.2 billion? Dave says that the competitive and exploitative world economy forces wages down to the “shittiest” levels. He is right that a global economy without concurrent global labor standards produces unacceptable wage depression. But stepping out of the textbooks for one second, you notice that Haiti is already the poorest country in the hemisphere, its economy contracting for three consecutive years, with 80% of the population living below the poverty line and two
   thirds of the population without formal jobs. Therefore, it is hard to see how any wage, no matter how low, could be worse than at present. A smarter line of argument would be to remove tariffs on Haitian goods coming into the U.S. and neighboring Caribbean countries, to ensure basic labor standards by foreign companies in Haiti be upheld, to make liberalization gradual, and to erase Haiti’s debt, some of which hark back to French Plantation reparations.

   Dave makes some valuable insights but fails ultimately to convince me that Kerry’s policy proposal was any better than Bush’s. Moreover, Dave fails to convey any practical alternative to the present crisis. This draws me to a larger point I have about political discussions amongst dudes. I feel that all too often nihilistic cynicism masquerades for sophisticated analysis. This kind of cynicism ultimately leads to unacceptable contradictions as I have tried to point out, because it is based on knee jerk opposition more than clear thinking. Surely critical reflection is the first step for any independent opinion, and we have good reason to doubt the actions and intentions of the Bush Administration. However, a more sophisticated position should take in account structures, constraints, alternatives, and a forensic view of history (looking at was has worked and failed in the past). Independent thinkers need to be ready to agree with their enemies and disagree with their friends when necessary. In many ways cynicism (like conspiracy theories) is escapist and intellectually lazy. It allows us to be armchair critics, to disengage ourselves from nasty problems of the world by avoiding to deal with them, and nurse our conscience. Such truncated thinking, while making us feel good and smart, ultimately does zero for people suffering. Yet we need to engage with these problems in both critical and practical fashion even if the alternatives are not ideal. I am aware that by trying to find practical solutions to these problems I may be only plastering up a fissure on an ultimately rotten and
   exploitative system. Worse, by iterating solutions instead of undermining the structure of international affairs, I may be only reinforcing it. Yet I find this less morally objectionable than offering criticism without solutions. As Marx said: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”

   Love Life and Thinking,

   Si

   PS. Maybe LSE (A school founded by socialists) is pumping neo-liberal bullshit into me, I don’t know.

3. Charlie Says:
   May 12th, 2004 at 11:13 am

   footnote #3

   Scene 1:
   Late Tuesday afternoon on the 2100 foot peak of Mt Tamalpais, highest point in the bay area. A dude is knackered after enormous bike ride/run in the morning but goes forth to scout exposed rock, howl at terradactyl sized crows (they are unimpressed and rudely stare back), and seek relief from the endless noise of city and town. On the peak there is stone to scramble over, thick brush to wade through, and a peaceful silence in the rush of wind stirred branches. To sit, even for a few minutes, allows me to finally relax and release the otherwise nonstop mental noise. More centering than surf or snow will ever be, it’s a pleasure to just sit. It’s beginning to get dark though and and soon I’m racing at ludicrous speed down switch back mountain road in tired red VW, trying to reach Tiburon in time to catch a boat ride across the bay.
   Scene 2:
   The sun has just set, a massive bank of apocalytic fog rolls boiling and grey above the lights of San Francisco and the Golden Gate bridge. I’m on board the restaurant’s plush "pizza delivery" boat with a cup of California pinot noire in hand, snug in thick fleecy coat but still in the trusty three dollar flip flops. Tom and Melissa and I motor across the dark bay to catch a jazz show in Oakland. The water is choppy, the breeze is cold and strong from the fog to the west, and our motorboat charges along as stars intermittently peek through the overcast. A ferry wake catches us unawares and while the boat flies up and crashes down, my pinot takes just a moment longer before gravity reclaims the scattering droplets. Fortunately my fleece is deep red and thirstily absorbes the settling droplets. Refill!
   We fly full speed up the Alameda shipping channel, past tugs in drydock, container ships rumbling at the quay, beneath the container loading cranes that inspired George Lucas’ massive four legged robot walkers in Star Wars. I give a howl to the wind for good measure and good fortune.
   Scene 3:
   Yoshi’s is a classic jazz club in Jack London square that serves sushi out front and dishes up rocking shows in the back. It’s a perfectly laid out music space with two low tiers of tables and booths, a small center front stage, soft theatre-like lighting, excellent sound system, and a large bank of thick glass bricks that let passing car headlights cast a brief flicker across the far wall. Trains rumbling by just outside reinforce the very urban feel of this little club.
   The band is a jazz trio: bassist, piano, and drums. They mix a rock feel into their jazz so that the bass carries a deeper and more vibrant tone than it otherwise would, and the songs leap back and forth between an improv feel and a melodic composed rocky sound. It’s a fun show, we open a bottle of chardonnay and order sushi as the set gets rolling. One tune stops me and freezes my barefeet to the footrest. It’s called Street Woman and my god was it ever the most intense jazz moment in my otherwise unjazzy life. They roll into it with some scattered piano, then the drums kick up a little solo, and then the bassist started ripping. He went and went and went! Impossible to describe, but it honestly was like incredible toe curling mind blowing sex, this solo built and built an incredible tension, it was at once melodic and beautiful but also tortured and controlling. I mean, it couldn’t have been longer than five minutes but it was the sort of thing that would have had Kerouac sweating in his socks and left him unable to even yell Yes Yes YES! Damn, maybe the chardonnay was a little strong, but it was unreal. Absolutely unreal. Forgive the sex analogy but that’s truly what the experience was like. Epic?

   Anyhow, we enjoyed the evening and happily motored back across the bay. Today is of course a new day and all I have are happy memories of last night. I’ve been enjoying the recent notes from various fields. It’s interesting the dialogue that’s going on regarding Haiti. Having been out to several anti-war/no blood for oil or mangoes demonstrations in San Francisco I’m struck by the difficulty of reconciling one’s (yes, my) idealism with the political and economic realities and needs of our days. On the street people call for a recall of forces from Iraq, or for support of the Palestinian uprising, or for protectionist economic policies. Well meaning ideas of course, but the results would likely be catastrophic. What sort of anger blinds protestors to the point that they will chant "long live Intifada!"? Are they mad, do they really want suicide bombers to infiltrate cafes and buses? Do they really want Iraq to descend into a state of retribution killings until the next strong man seizes control? Of course not, they want peace and justice, but they’re frustrated with the world they see today.
   The film ‘Waking Life’, an animated exploration of Existenialism, illustrates the divide between thinkers and doers and demonstrates how it’s ridiculous to be only a thinker or only a doer. I often feel that the protestors in the street are doer’s but without a coherent or helpful message, while I personally tend to be a dreamer and occasional pragmatic thinker, but often feel too overwhelmed by the enormity of the problems faced by the most downtrodden to take legitimate and useful action. It’s easier to focus on triathlon, surfing, and journaling than to honestly face real issues. And this is my greatest failing and weakness, this focus on egotistical pursuits such as athletic competition when I could be expending this youthful energy on efforts to improve (or take down) the "system."
   Dave writes what some of us truly feel, an unhappiness with aspects of Western history and with the unequitable allocation of energy and resources that is due to selfish human nature and self interest (to greatly oversimplify). Both he and Simon are right to in their own ways, Davey in questioning the true motives of western powers and Simon in demonstrating what Haiti really needs to move forward from this point. It’s very important to understand a historical context, but it’s also crucial present future objectives and fixes for problems. I only wish that I could understand and write about these things with the lucidity and insight that they both do.
   Well, things here are obviously good and enjoyable. Upcoming adventures will include an epic triathlon in early May, then a two week trip to Belgium and France in early June. My travel life has usually been about means to ends, so I’ll be racing in the duathlon world’s in Belgium for the US team, but the underlying reason for going is to tackle the 800+ beers on offer before mounting a full scale Carlos assault on French viniculture. Is a side trip to Chamonix justifiable? Am also considering a move to Portland Oregon in June to take on some schooling and establish a volcano base camp, west coast, to complement Scoob’s forays into the highlands of south america. I’ve greatly enjoyed hearing everyone’s news and highlights and it has been a pleasure passing polar bear factoids on to the pizza consuming masses and urging the local poets to post their work on Risa’s writing site. People are a little puzzled about how I came to associate with people who chew coca leaf to alleviate altitude dizziness, but I assure them that field tests by several dudes have revealed no harmful side effects and we should really consider growing the stuff here. It would save a bundle in shipping costs, especially if Haiti is out of the loop.
   Best of luck to all, I’ll send a howl to all your corners of the world.
   -Charlie

4. Dave Says:
   May 12th, 2004 at 11:19 am

   footnote #4

   A response to Simon’s response to Dave’s response to Simon’s letter about democracy in Haiti and America.

   This has been sitting around awhile, and though it somehow seems less relevant now, I’d been meaning to redeem myself. Welcome back Luke, your stories have been charming and inspirational; repatriation will be complete upon arrival on
   MDI.

   Dudes,
   As Simon noted constructive criticism can be a wonderfully positive thing, but in my case, more for its ability to reveal discontinuity between my thoughts and their ultimate elaboration as well as the occasional gaping hole in logic. Upon rereading Simon’s original email, I realize how badly I misread his critique and essentially laid the foundations for my response upon a shaky and non-existent parallel argument. An apt analogy can be found in an experience earlier this week when I exited at an unfamiliar el stop, followed directions to walk three blocks west, (and unknowingly turned east) at which point the road
   dead-ended at a mural after two blocks, leaving me confused and instead of realizing that I’d gone the wrong way, I just assumed I misheard the directions.
   Anyway….
   Simon, first off, my apologizes for what was a condescending and insulting tone in my email to you. Although I didn’t make it clear, I have complete respect for your skills in political reasoning, your beliefs in what you are doing, and your reasons for doing them. Simon, I suppose in the end, I share your opinion that Kerry’s hypothetical comments were woefully inadequate, but
   I’m much less enthusiastic about the outcome of the coup and Haiti’s resulting future. I commend Si’s thorough railing of me for an illogical flow of disconnected thoughts and bringing in the structure of the world economy which is irrelevant to the nature of this discussion (although since it forms the basis upon which one evaluates the future success of policy, it is crucially
   interconnected). So two valuable lessons learned thus far: 1) Thoroughly read what you attempt to criticize and 2) when you start off a response to a grad student at LSE with the comments “for fear you have too much neoliberal bullshit being pumped into you…” you’d better come out swinging.
   Having reread my analysis of the Haitian situation, I must admit that it loses all semblance of logical progression as a result of heavy emotive influence. That being said, my frustration over various international events and resulting rant on the global system are the consequence of a process of gathering and analyzing distressing information (there are few ‘facts’) as opposed to an all out knee-jerk reaction (though I am susceptible). I suppose I still haven’t learned to disconnect heart and head in these matters. The dominance of emotion over logic makes for poor policy but I nonetheless trust in its value as a moral anchor for evaluating the justice behind policy. So please allow me to attempt to elaborate further on the points which I poorly touched
   upon previously, attempting to use more concrete examples and less paraphrasing.
   Turning to the criticisms Simon has laid against me:
   Mischaracterization of the debate- check in the box
   By mischaracterizing the original debate (policy in Haiti as dictated by Bush vs. Kerry) I turned the discussion as to whether or not the military intervention in Haiti was a) something that warranted credit to Bush policy and b) was beneficial to the majority of Haitians (potential massacre notwithstanding). On both of these points I would still maintain that in my analysis, the answer to these two questions is negative, despite the fact that a dictator has been removed from power and a potential humanitarian crisis
   averted. As Simon has rightly pointed out, this second consideration alone legitimizes the intervention of foreign actors. The tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda is a stark reminder of this. For reasons I’ll discuss in a moment however, what is most likely the removal of one dictator to install a group of politicians representing equally narrow interest groups is something
   that would otherwise not warrant such action. A serious threat to the lives of thousands of people should be acted upon, but in the case of Haiti, it has legitimized a use of force, reinstituted that force within the government, and thereby ensured that any further popular unrest will not result in another coup, since the government controls the gun. That is certainly a desirable outcome
   for citizens in a democracy, but not in a state ruled by a small elite who depends on force to maintain control. In my analysis, this is the type of government that will emerge in Haiti given the total exclusion of the previous government and enough room from international pressure; I will elaborate further on this issue when it becomes more relevant to my argument.
   One of the most important issues in evaluating this crisis is the inconsistent role played by the United States. In my initial analysis, I admit I overemphasized the nature of the conspiracy theory, but it can’t be entirely dismissed that this administration is one that holds pathological grudges against ideologues (Aristide, Chavez, Castro) and finances groups against them. Interestingly, the lack of a Kerry presidental platform has already led him to raisethis point. Throughout most phases of the international mediation, the Bush administration claimed to seek a political solution without allowing
   military intervention. I argue that this move in effect strengthened the legitimacy of the rebel group and slowly undermined Aristide, simply by allowing the movement to gain force and even some legitimacy through the capture of several cities. But what has Washington gained by removing Aristide? Would the Bush administration change course, break away from its co-mediators, and invade only to get rid of this man? It seems to me that its actions would suggest that the administration was bent on doing so, otherwise, the US would’ve allowed an international force to intervene sooner. What has come to pass is a government that will no longer overtly challenge Washington and is still acceptable to most of the international community. As I noted before, the US has no economic, military, or otherwise interest in Haiti. The only role that Haiti plays in US foreign policy is that it cannot be out of control as it was. What I argued what that there was concern that an intense conflict would bring criticism upon the US government by Latin America’s leaders and possibly delude the Dominican Republic with refugees (Interestingly the border remains entirely closed). Clearly the ensuing disaster would be entirely out of line with US interests. In the end, the US made it clear that Aristide had to go, and ultimately dismissed him a surprisingly precise and painless way. Insofar as the Bush administration’s agenda was concerned, this was a success. From a standpoint of international justice, these actions are not laudible; a gamble that paid off.
   In response Simon presents several arguments concerning the role of various foreign actors that I would like to take issue with. Firstly, Simon is correct in criticizing my oversimplification of Canada’s role in every phase of the negotiations. I overlooked Canada’s proportionally more significant Haitian population (I disregarded this fact initially because France and the US have the
   first and third highest diaspora populations respectively, Paris and New York being larger centres than Montreal) and one that is consequently more vocal. Before, I woefully attempted to elucidate that Haiti figures importantly in Canadian foreign policy by virtue of being francophone. Canada, unlike the US and France, is both hemispheric and of similar linguistic heritage (I believe
   it’s also the only place in the western hemisphere where there are more French speakers than in Quebec) and thus presents what the Martin government (or what the Chretian government once saw) sees as a natural role in which Canada can help decide forceful hemispheric policy. My earlier discussion was accurately attacked for making it seem as though this
   role has just sprung forth under the new government. As Simon noted, Canada has long been involved with humanitarian projects in Haiti and Canadian peacekeeping troops have immense experience in global peacekeeping, both of which are vital
   services given the situation in Haiti (Especially since Marines never play the role of peacekeeper). These two points were overwhelmingly important in influencing Canadian involvement in the Haitian revolt. Nonetheless, the first opportunity for Martin’s government to cooperate with the Bush administration in a foreign policy objective cannot be overlooked. Though Simon has convinced me that “kissing American ass” didn’t figure principally into Canada’s decision to intervene in Haiti, civil and military co-operation in the ravaged country is the top billing for discussion when Martin goes to Washington on April 30. Close second is border security issues though I’m not sure of missile defense. Military cooperation in Haiti is the first potential
   step towards talks of sending Canadian troops to Iraq. While George was most likely indifferent towards the five hundred soldiers Ottawa sent to Haiti, it would be a serious understatement to say that a contingent of a few thousand to replace departing Spanish troops would be warmly welcomed. But again, I’m dancing into heavy speculation.
   The main discrepancy that I have with Simon’s appraisal concerns the nature of negotiations, the roles played by France and the United States, and the decisions surrounding the ultimate military intervention. Simon’s statement regarding in rebuttal to my statement on US diplomacy was “the peace plan proposed by the US was…..one backed by the OAS, CARICOM, and the UN.
   Furthermore conspiracy theories of Americans propping up puppet statesmen are hard to maintain since the process to select a new prime minister and establish elections were proposed by CARICOM and backed by Canada, the OAS, and the UN. Lastly, the UN Security Council legitimized the international peacekeeping role.” This statement was provided as supporting Simon’s critique of my claim that Washington knew of the rebels’ activities and perhaps even supplied them. I’ve already discussed that such an accusation is based on speculation, forcing me to withdraw that claim but I will further use the quote to explain the hidden reality of the turmoil under which negotiations took place and the erratic nature of Washington and Paris which in the end led to the abandonment of peace talks and the coordinated decision to send Marines into Port au Prince. It’s important to note that CARICOM continues to refuse to recognize the current government pending the investigation of Aristide’s ouster, though it will likely drop
   that protest at its next meeting in July.
   In June 2001, similar armed disruptions by the Haitian opposition resulted in international mediation with the OAS assuming the initiative, led by the United States. Although no one disputed the fact that Aristide had violated the constitution by running for a third term as president nor that he further manipulated the vote to allow Lavalas to take contestable seats, the OAS
   appeased Aristide in order to avert conflict (Instead Aristide used this temporary lull to allow the chimere a mini-reign of terror) and gave him until November of 2004 to hold new elections, as well as comply with several other arrangements (namely prosecute political crimes) Clearly, as of February, Aristide wasn’t on his way to fulfilling any of those promises, and given the
   potential for violent bloodshed by rebel forces, the crisis crusendoed. Simon has put forth his reasons for why the relatively painless removal of Aristide was the strategy that he preferred, especially given the role of international mediators, the disarmament and exclusion of the rebels (many of which were convicted for human rights abuses), and the potential for renewed
   international interest. I respect that opinion, but nonetheless continue to believe it would’ve been preferable to reach a political settlement that both avoided the potential massacre and allowed for a power-sharing agreement that would’ve limited Aristide’s power without guaranteeing the future isolation of his supporters. This was also the hopeful outcome preferred by CARICOM and the United Nations. In the end, this settlement was made impossible because of the actions of the United States and France. According to Washington, the decision to send in the marines was because the arrival of the guerillas in Port-au-Prince demanded immediate action to avoid bloodshed. In the end, it seems to me that the process of negotiations created this impending threat.
   As the political clamouring began again in November and reached intensity in February, one thing remained consistent amongst the deliberating international participants: a power-sharing compromise. The plan of action put forth by the OAS and CARICOM with US involvement and backing by Colin Powell primarily involved maintaining Aristide in power until the end of his term (2006, with which I agree with Simon was unacceptably long), the appointment of a prime minister selected by the opposition, international help for new electoral arrangements, and a force of international peacekeepers. This agreement was one that Aristide committed to. One can point to the number of times that Aristide has failed to keep his promises, but in this one, it would’ve been difficult for him not to. The presence of international mediators, and a strong opposition would have made it impossibly hard for Aristide to maintain his grip
   on power, yet still allow for a transition (what I would call in other rhetoric, a subtle seizure of power by the opposition). I disagree with the claim that keeping Aristide in power under these circumstances would be worthy of denouncement by human rights groups as appeasement. After Aristide committed to these terms, it was the rebel/opposition that rejected them, and even as late as February 25th, the UN Security Council “deplore[d] the decision by the opposition to reject the plan of action.” The United States (and France, but true not Canada) then broke with the OAS, CARICOM, and UN to suggest that
   Aristide abandon office, which he did, although under exactly what circumstances is still unclear.
   Now referring back to Simon’s comment above, this is where political catch-up started. The UN Security Council Resolution 1529 authorized the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, but only after the Marines were on the ground. On the same day, the OAS quickly approved the appointment of the new government. Only CARICOM has criticized this action, most notably because it had called for intervention weeks before while Aristide was in power. As noted, it still refuses to recognize the new Haitian government. So while months of negotiations were directed to political compromise, in the end, the situation deteriorated into a use of quick force and a promise of money and aid to quell international objection. Although Haiti sorely needs both. The abrupt decision to change the course of action in a way that is detrimental to the future of Haitian politics (coup number 32 and counting) is the principal reason that I find the administration’s move deplorable. Perhaps dirtier is how quickly the other actors changed their minds as well. The flow of aid will return (the loss of which over three years totaled $500
   million, approximately $20 per head a year) but it is unclear exactly what form it will take. The US has a nasty habit of calling military training and hardware “aid,” and given Haiti’s position in the Caribbean drug trade, its likely that there will be some crackdown. $50 million/year in assault rifles doesn’t really put food on anyone’s table.
   In the month since the coup, Simon is right in pointing out that the international community has focused on disarming the rebels, which is a crucial move to end reprisal killings and return “order” throughout the country. The new Haitian government, on the otherhand, has made its principal order of business the prosecution of Aristide’s former ministers, as the high profile
   case of Jocelenne Privert attests, while turning a blind eye to crimes of the rebels, particularly those who have already been convicted of human rights violations (notably Chamblain and Tatoune). New Prime Minister Gerard Latortue has been flown throughout the country in US army helicopters to give speeches with men whose crimes he hails. Only President Alexandre remains of the Lavalas ruling group. To me, this is an unacceptably low inclusion rate, primarily because Lavalas came to power as a result of significant popular expression.
   Among major electoral violations that Aristide commited involved rigging the runoff system that is giving a victory to candidates with ‘near majority’ (admittedly that could be a mere 25%). I don’t think anyone would dispute the fact that Lavalas was popular; definitely not enough so as to warrant its dictatorial behavior, but it elicited significant popular support. The near total exclusion of that party from this settlement and its likely exclusion from elections in the near future are another death knell for democracy in Haiti and should create misgivings amongst anyone believing in that institution. Of course, the 80% living in absolute poverty could care less about democracy so long as living standards would raise marginally.
   Strangely, I find Kerry’s proposal (which was military intervention by the US alone to keep Aristide in power) equally deplorable because it puts a single nation’s face as the invader/savior, however one sees it, and in general, I find myself more likely to vote for Bush than Kerry and more likely to vote for American idol than for either. Haiti is no worse off than she was before, likely no better, and a massacre was averted. Were it not for UN security council power politics, it is possible that the preferred aim of international peacekeepers and a power-sharing agreement could’ve come to fruition. So I suppose that it seems that Simon and I agree on most of the events that have occurred over the past few weeks. The only significant point of departure would be our opinions of Haiti’s future under the new regime. That doesn’t mean, a practical solution should not be formulated and implemented, but this coup shows that we don’t learn from history in finding them.
   A point I’d like to further discuss is incredibly relevant in the discussion we’ve been having: the availability and credibility of information.
   
   Strangely, Si, the one comment of yours that struck me most was that “dissatisfaction with Aristide in Haiti was widespread and went far beyond the 400-odd soldiers that decided to exploit this satisfaction.” While I’ll agree that far more than 400 were dissatisfied with Aristide (several protests capped 20,000), given the various channels of information presented to us, it’s
   impossible to know the range of support and opposition. Since you’ve been to Haiti, I’m willing to extend the benefit of the doubt that you are more aware of how the people you met felt towards the government than I could claim to know, but nonetheless, information is distorted is such a diabolically strategic way that its still impossible to know the prevalence of discontent is in a rural country of 8 million. Haitians showed incredible rates of participation in the first elections in 1991, a fact which is uplifting considering the country’s history, and while no one is better off with a dictator in power, it seems a risky gamble to base the future of those people on an opposition with elements from the Duvalier days that have already failed them. As I searched for information on this
   conflict, it seems that for every protest of 10,000 against Aristide, you could find one of 10,000 for him. This information isn’t available through US sources, but through those of Latin America and the Caribbean where governments have a different agenda, and therefore a different end to which they deliberately mislead their citizenry. But I’ll check that cynicism before it starts.
   Referring to Simon’s extensive and healthy critique on cynicism, I’d like to add that cynicism breeds doubt and to some extent, fear, but it only offers an escape from intellectual rigor if you entirely leave off thorough analysis. I’m guilty of having allowed cynicism overwhelm me AND having presented a poor analysis. But I believe the two are only so connected. In a world where concrete facts are hard to come by, we form a concept of global events that are entirely based on our expectations of accuracy. What we’ve gleamed from the past necessarily influences what we expect from the future. Since cynicism is the result of that process, I wouldn’t discredit its importance as a tool so long as it’s a guide to arriving at a thorough conclusion. We don’t have the luxury of living in the ideal world that we attempt to discuss and theorize; life itself is therefore an inherent contradiction. I
   admire Simon’s passion to help make a framework that will better the lives of at least some people. Each of us has spent his/her post-undergraduate phase in a different way, each searching for something different, but nonetheless whole-heartedly. Cynicism can only be so bad if its allowed to lead to total inaction. Among those of us here who work with children in orphanages or schools, help to formulate global health and policy agendas, or just enjoy the magnificance of a sunny day, that hasn’t happened yet. I’ve been talking to long, and realized I’m still confused. Good luck with finals and life.

   Dave

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